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ESSAY
EXPLAINING JUDICIAL LAWGIVERS*
ROBERT P. SMITH, JR.**

In Pilgrim at Tinker Creek, Annie Dillard tells an engaging
story of mantises, aphids, otters and other things living and moving in the Roanoke Valley.' Tinker Creek makes only one point,
really, but makes it again and again: that nature has afforded so
rich a variety of life in her valley only because she is willing to
throw so much of it away.
On the one hand, nature desires all the possibilities equally. It is
not sufficient, she seems to say, that the valley has 1,000 varieties
of winged legged things in the color brown; she will conjure 10,000.
Therefore the valley is given outrageous particularities: a female
mantis, say, devouring her lover joint by crackling joint while he
consummates the last pleasure he will ever know. Nature enacts
that spectacle, and Dillard portrays it, not as a model for all of life,
nor to say that a mantis consumed by love is more remarkable
than a beaver swimming, but to show how well nature loves her
particularities, her conceits.
But too, nature voraciously consumes her creatures. Creation itself consumes, for to make a particular butterfly is to abandon, at
least for then, the nascent alternates. Some creatures are called to
life in mutated vulnerability. For others, there is the predator. For
the rest, some other mortality. Variously created, they are variously consumed. To go to Tinker Creek with Annie Dillard is to
learn a parable, that nature is profligate, constantly birthing and
consuming her creation with wild extravagance.
In nature's own way, judicial lawgiving celebrates the particular
both for its own value and as parable. By little essays the writing
judges locate the particular affairs of mostly private persons in the
moral and historical perspective that is the ken of courts; then of
that stuff the judges make stories having lessons. By such parables,
* From the author's "explanation" to nonlawyer friends and colleagues, members of the
Society for Values in Higher Education meeting at St. Mary's College, South Bend, Indiana,
August 19, 1976. Footnotes signaled by daggers contain material newly added for this
publication in 1983.
** Judge of the District Court of Appeal, First District, State of Florida, since 1975, and
Chief Judge 1981-83; B.A., Washington & Lee University, 1954; J.D. replacing LL.B., University of Florida, 1957.
1.

A. DILLARD, PILGRIM AT TINKER CREEK (Harper Rowe, 1974).
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well known to us as Marbury v. Madison, Brown v. Board of Education, Escobedo v. Illinois, and Miranda v. Arizona, persons otherwise wholly unknown to most of us, William Marbury, Oliver
Brown, Danny Escobedo, and Ernesto Miranda, became carriers of
truth newly perceived and told.2
In studying the parables of judicial lawgiving, one mustn't be
distracted by celebrities. Among Tinker Creek inhabitants one may
prefer the Monarch butterfly because she is pretty, or because she
flies 2,500 miles to winter in central Mexico, or for other arbitrary
reasons. But the valley's law of particularity is that nature spends
herself no less generously on the doomed male mantis. And though
you may never have learned the parables of Paul Micallef and
Franklin Palmer, let alone their personal names, they too inhabit
the valley of legal reality as surely as Marbury, Brown, Escobedo
and Miranda.
Paul Micallef, of Farmingdale, New York, ran a printing press
for Lincoln Graphic Arts.' It was the great model RU 1, capable of
20,000 sheets per hour, which Lincoln bought from the manufacturer. Occasionally, Paul and his fellows knew, debris they called
"hickies" stuck to the printing plates. As they also knew, hickies
would transfer to a piece of plastic slipped momentarily between
the grinding plates, and so could be removed without stopping the
press. This they called "chasing hickies on the run." They chased
hickies on the run because the great model RU 1, once stopped,
needed three hours to begin printing again. One day, while feeding
a piece of plastic to the plates, Paul Micallef's hand was drawn in
and crushed.
In an earlier parable called Campo v. Scofield,4 the New York
Court of Appeals had said that the manufacturer of a dangerous
machine is not liable for design negligence if the danger was open
and obvious to users. By that teaching, though a simple guard on
the RU 1 would have kept Paul's hand safe while chasing hickies,
the manufacturer Miehle still would not be responsible to Paul for
negligence in failing to supply the guard. As a result of Paul's action, however, the New York court abandoned the old teaching and
announced in Paul's name a new perception of broader manufacturer's responsibility. By that parable, at pages 571 to 579 of Vol2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).
3. Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (N.Y. 1976).

4.

301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (N.Y. 1950).
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ume 348 of the Northeastern Reporter, Second Series, in libraries
around the world, the particular hand of Paul Micallef is the carrier of historic judicial lawgiving.
So it was also with Franklin Palmer, who lived in the Gulf Coast
town of Southport, Florida." He and his friends drank late at the
Seahorse Lounge, then evidently decided to break and enter
Libby's Bait Shop. A suspicious bartender later called the police,
who found Palmer and the others with a carload of fishing tackle,
cigarettes and beer, evidently Libby's property. During Palmer's
trial for larceny, the trial judge charged the jury, as requested by
the prosecutor, that the unexplained possession of recently stolen
goods gives rise to an inference that those in possession are
thieves.
After his conviction, Palmer appealed to Florida's First District
Court of Appeal and complained about that jury instruction. The
court, or at any rate two of the three judges, generally agreed with
Palmer that in jury trials the prerogative to draw incriminating inferences or not, from someone's "unexplained possession of recently stolen goods," was exclusively that of common-sense jurors,
free from influence by inferences declared as law. But as other judicial parables of ancient lineage taught contrary lessons, the court
was put to explaining why those precedents were obsolete and why
new standards should control Palmer's and future cases.
The court wrote that the decisive mutation in the law, transforming the nature of the problem and its solution, was latter-day
sensitivity to Palmer's constitutional right to be silent when accused, and to suffer no penalty for it. So Franklin Palmer became
the carrier of that mutation. Personally he received a new trial,
and the parable bearing his name is preserved in Volume 323, page
612, of the Southern Reporter, Second Series.
There can no longer be serious doubt that the writing judges are
lawgivers. In 1921 Cardozo delivered his Yale lectures on The Nature of the Judicial Process and brought clearly to the consciousness of that earlier generation the fact of judicial lawgiving:6
What is it that I do when I decide a case? To what sources of
information do I appeal for guidance? In what proportions do I
permit them to contribute to the result? In what proportions
ought they to contribute? If a precedent is applicable, when do I
5. Palmer v. State, 323 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), cert. denied, 336 So. 2d 108 (Fla.
1976).
6. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 10-11 (35th printing 1975).
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refuse to follow it? If no precedent is applicable, how do I reach
the rule that will make a precedent for the future? If I am seeking
logical consistency, the symmetry of the legal structure, how far
shall I seek it? At what point shall the quest be halted by some
discrepant custom, by some consideration of the social welfare, by
my own or the common standards of justice and morals? Into
that strange compound which is brewed daily in the caldron of
the courts, all these ingredients enter in varying proportions. I am
not concerned to inquire whether judges ought to be allowed to
brew such a compound at all. I take judge-made law as one of the
existing realities of life. There, before us, is the brew. Not a judge
on the bench but has had a hand in the making.
Cardozo helped liberate us from the fiction that judicial decisions are made in the manner of an accurate deduction, as by formal logic, from an accepted proposition embodied in precedent. As
Llewellyn seems to suggest in The Common Law Tradition,7 we
never really had such a system and it is hypocrisy to bemoan the
fact that we don't have it any more.
Nor is judicial lawgiving confined to the common law, the ceded
realm of judges. Statutes, even, are stuff for judicial lawmaking.
Justice Traynor of California described the task of statutory interpretation, and its range: "Rare are the statutes that rest in peace
beyond the range of controversy. Large problems of interpretation
inevitably arise. Plain words, like plain people, are not always so
plain as they seem." 8
Judicial labor upon statutes does not always stop at interpretation. Occasionally statutes hoary with age will be taken as latticework for new judicial formulations, new rights, new adjustments of
relationships within society. Consider, for example, the 1976
United States Supreme Court decision desegregating a private
school in Virginia.9 That was not required by the fourteenth
amendment, which inhibits only state action. Rather the Court
found that an Act of Congress passed in 1866 had that effect. In
1968, the Court found for the first time that the 1866 Act forbade
racial discrimination in private contracts. After 102 years, a dormant mutation suddenly gained vitality, and in 1976, acting on the
student body of a particular school in Virginia, it transformed private education.
7.

K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADmON (1960).
8. Traynor, No Magic Words Could Do It Justice, 49 CALiF. L. REV. 615, 618 (1961).
9. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).

19831

ESSAY

That episode of judicial creativity must be considered remarkable even by those who enthusiastically support the purpose of it
and are accustomed to judicial lawgiving. As Justice Stevens said,
concurring in the decision, "There is no doubt in my mind that
that construction of the statute would have amazed the legislators
who voted for it." Nevertheless, he said, if that construction of the
1866 Act "did not accurately reflect the sentiments of the Reconstruction Congress, it surely accords with the prevailing sense of
justice today."10
There is still something scandalous in the revelation that judges
are influenced by factors external to "the facts" of a case and "the
law" narrowly conceived. The legitimation of such influences has
multiplied decisional choices not only in the great causes before
the United States Supreme Court but in every case in every court.
From knowledge of the facts of judicial life arise the temptations
of dishonest rationalization, misstatement of facts, disregard of impediments to a desired result, deliberate misinterpretation of precedent, misleading emphasis, and silence when explanation is
impossible.
What works for continuity in a system where the decisional
ground surges and splits in response to private preference and social force? What works for confidence in a system where unspeakable intellectual aberrations are not only possible but seemingly inevitable? What works for society accepting the judgments of an
enclave of writers who have no army, no taxing power, no patronage to effectuate their will?
The judge's essential instrument of both power and self-control
is the written opinion. Justice Traynor says a judge writes to "persuade his colleagues, make sense to the bar, pass muster with the
scholars, and if possible allay the suspicion of any man in the
street who regards knowledge of the law as no excuse for making
it." Indeed that is so. But beyond the purpose to placate the Micallefs and Palmers, whose fate we decide, and to satisfy peers near
and far, who may decide our own, in writing these parables we
judges explain ourselves, our place in the story told and in the telling. Thus did Annie Dillard write of the valley. In her case and
ours that works for a true story.
It is a peculiar distortion of what we properly demand of judges
10. Id. at 189, 191.
11. Traynor, supra note 8, at 621.
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and of professionals in general to confuse impartiality, the ability
to weigh fairly various competing considerations and to render
considered judgments accordingly, with the impersonal denial and
alienation of the self. Impartiality, properly understood, may be
an intensely personal expression of deep emotional and intellectual capacities of the self, but they are capacities which are sensitive to and engaged by reasonableness in weighing just and
proper claims fairly. In the case of judges in the law, such impartiality in the articulation of rights, far from requiring impersonal
detachment, requires the deepest and most responsible engagement of the person of the judge in searching within the recesses
of the self for the foundations of one's integrity as a person
which, qua person, one universalizes to all persons alike. Like persons in general, a judge cannot escape his or her ultimate personal
responsibility for such judgments which engage the authentic resources of the self to establish meaning and moral coherence.t
As a mode of explanation an opinion is multifaceted. It is the decisive end of a particular controversy between identifiable parties. It
is a piece of formal argument, a dance through compulsory figures
as predictable as those of any quadrille or reel. It appeals to selfevident truths for permission to advance one step. It is a carriertt
of ideas that will decide controversies yet unborn. It is personal,
autobiographical literature.
Various tools are required for the task of explanation. In overruling one's own prior decision, as did the New York court in Micallef's case, little more is required than a straightforward declaration
that we were previously wrong, or that new information has become available. In Micallef the new data included sustained criticism by scholars, an increasing number of other courts that had
abandoned the old rule, and a growing conviction that "in our
highly complex and technological society, we fall victim to the
manufacturer who holds himself out as an expert in his field. 2
Against such forces the old rule of Campo v. Scofield could not
stand.
In Palmer's case, the court's task of discrediting the old rule was
t

D. Richards, The Theory of Adjudication and the Task of the Great Judge, 1 Ca-

DOZO L. REV. 171, 209 (1979).

tt Here and elsewhere I have introduced the metaphor "carrier"into the 1976 text.
This by way of commending to the reader the writing of Milner S. Ball, professor of law at
the University of Georgia. His use of imagery in describing law is vastly instructive and
liberating.See, e.g., Ball, Of Rocks and Dams, PVC and Poetry: Conceptual Metaphors for
Law, 36 THE GEORG A REvIEW 7 (1982).
12. Micallef, 39 N.Y.2d at 383, 348 N.E. at 576, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 120.
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not so simple. A frontal attack as in Micallef was impossible, for
the rule approving jury instructions on incriminating inferences
was embedded in decisions of a superior court. The only possible
course, therefore, was more circuitous: to show how the old rule
cohabited with fifth amendment values only through laborious and
unsatisfying rationalizations; to declare the jury instruction error
in Palmer's case even if otherwise proper, because no one proved
that Palmer in fact did not explain, when he was found in possession of goods from Libby's Bait Shop; and finally to doubt that
proof of that sort, essential if we are to beckon inferences from
one's unexplained possession of recently stolen goods, could ever
be supplied without asking the prisoner questions forbidden by the
fifth amendment. Said the court: "It is not clear to us why, without
custodial interrogation, an innocent person would spontaneously
explain when apprehended how he came to possess goods he did
1' 3
not steal or know were stolen.
In writing about the leeways of precedent, Llewellyn counted
and listed sixty-four distinct "available impeccable precedent techniques" and suggested the existence of many more such tools on
the appellate workbench."' The flat overruling of an outworn precedent, as in Micallef, is number forty-eight. Palmer contained elements of several of Llewellyn's categories.
Unlike Micallef, which in a stroke obliterated an old principle
and raised up a new one for prospective application in New York,
the immediate effect of the Palmer decision was only to gain
Palmer a new trial. Its effect in future trials will be to give the
prosecutors concern over whether the proof justifies requesting the
jury instruction. Conceivably the Palmer decision could one day
assist the Supreme Court of Florida in deciding whether to adhere
to the precedents that Palmer avoided but could not overturn. It is
also quite possible that, like some latently powerful mutation at
Tinker Creek that might have transformed otters but somehow
didn't, the Palmer mutation will be cancelled or diverted, or will
simply fail of effect.ttf
When Annie Dillard put her face close to the moth larvae, she
13. Palmer, 323 So. 2d at 618.
14. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 7, at 77-91.
ttt The Palmer mutation is dead or dormant. Its unstabilizing effect was recognized in
Hudson v. State, 383 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), criticized in Smith v. State, 378 So.
2d 313 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), and expressly disapproved by the Supreme Court of Florida
in Smith v. State, 394 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 1981). The fate of Palmer since this paper was
delivered in 1976 perhaps illustrates my theme all the better.
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better understood the emerging, well, moth-ness of it. But she did
not know the whole point of the valley's parable until she drew
away and saw, from a distance, that such particularity is abundant,
diverse beyond anyone's planning, achieved through wild
extravagance.
Appellate lawgiving is preceded by a trial engaging a judge, lawyers, jurors, witnesses, clerks, bailiffs, process servers and others;
by a considered trial court judgment; by laboriously preparing a
written transcript of all that was said and done at trial; by gathering and binding all the papers and exhibits; by warehousing it all
in the appellate court; by lawyers preparing written briefs and
presenting oral argument to the appellate judges; by a collegial decision tentatively arrived at; by preparing, in appropriate cases, a
written opinion; by recording it, with any dissent, as judgment; by
reproducing and immediately distributing 200 or so copies of it.
Then lawgiving moves into another realm of reality. A national
publisher digests and indexes each opinion and publishes it in a
volume with the opinions of other appellate courts of the state and
region. Palmer's decision occupies seven pages of a volume containing 1,010 pages. That volume is one of 161 volumes of American appellate decisions published in the national reporter system
during the year 1975-76.ttt That is more than all published appellate opinions in the history of the English judicial system, which
annually adds three or four volumes to its basic library. How many
thousands of copies of the volumes containing Micallef's and
Palmer's cases are sold throughout the world is a secret well kept
by the publisher.
American lawgiving, like nature, is profligate in creation, determined that every one of these mostly unknown persons shall have
at least his name and identifying number published and sold to
law libraries throughout the world. Paul Micallef's name, perhaps
even Franklin Palmer's, will be spoken in public places from time
to time, and their parables will be repeated to succeeding generations. They would be astonished.
When bound in buckram and arrayed on library shelves, these
volumes symbolize the writing judges' craft and signify reason,
continuity and power. Architects have their buildings, surgeons the
cool image of the surgical suite, all of steel and lighted glass and
sharp things, artists their canvases and sculpture, teachers their
publications and gardens of students. But lawyers and judges who
tttt

During 1982 the annual accretion grew to 248 volumes.
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wish to be identified with the symbol of learning, of power, of continuity with Frankfurter and Cardozo and Holmes and Marshall
and Coke and Bacon, have their pictures taken before a shelf of
law reports.
Karl Llewellyn claims that the abundant particularity of American judicial lawgiving came about as the result of surplus energy at
work in society, energy not necessary in the struggle for existence.
Like the radio, silk stockings and the motor car, Llewellyn said
some years ago, this abundance is a luxury grown into a necessity,
"though fewer people are alive to its necessity." 16
I cannot say, or at any rate will not here attempt to say, whether
in any absolute sense it is necessary that we have judicial lawmaking as I have described it. Certainly it is no more necessary that
the law have Franklin Palmer's parable than that the valley have
the doomed male mantis. But whether that is necessary, or in a
global view frivolous, or in a cosmic view irrelevant, we writing
judges declare by our craft that these mostly unknown persons,
and their mostly private affairs, are not replaceable individually or
as the stuff of parables. As long as that commitment stands, there
will be a craft such as I have described, and necessarily its task will
continue to be as John Maguire described it at my investiture in
August 1975:ttttt
In this go-go era of machine produced instant products, craftsmanship in all fields is fading. A religious-like calling seems required to stay at that desk, to keep probing the texts, to keep
seeking the words through which facts are perceived and accounts
rendered. But our sustenance and survival depends upon this
willingness of judges to be scholars. I take it that constitutional
processes are not self-evident, that he who runs will not be able to
read, that rendering an interpretation requires probing, reflection,
disciplined fashioning of phrases that clearly mirror the mind's
intent. That's scholarship.

15. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 115 (7th printing 1978).
ttttt Delivered August 1, 1975, at the District Court of Appeal, First District, Tallahassee, Florida. John David Maguire was in 1976 president of the Society for Values in
Higher Education, at whose Fellows' Meeting this paper was delivered. He was then president of the State University of New York at Old Westbury, and is now president of the
Claremont University and Graduate Center, in California.He was and is my old and valued friend who from college days has pondered with me questions like those raised in this
paper.

